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Research is a productive activity where the primary outputs are innovations or intellectual
property and the major inputs (in most cases) are services of human or intellectual capital.
Innovations are primary sources of economic growth (Romer 1990, 1994; Huffman and Evenson
1993; Griliches 1990, 1994) and have large social rates of return (Huffman and Evenson 1993;
Adams 1990). Research as a production activity involves output uncertainty. For research in
general and pretechnology sciences, the uncertainty is so great that no exact output can be defined.
Ex ante ou^ut is not contractible. For research in applied sciences, the uncertamty is less because
specific innovations can be identified. For example, a specific drug, machine, or chemical is
contractible. However, the quality or specific attributes of the innovation are uncertain.
Most of the innovations from research in the general and pretechnology sciences are pure
public goods while a few are impure public goods (see Huffman and Evenson 1993, Chapter 2). In
applied scientific research, the proportions of public and private goods are reversed. Impure public
goods involve joint products where one is a pure public good and the other is a private good which
is excludable and rival. Although modest private incentives for undertaking the production of pure
public goods may exist, privately financed general and pretechnology research alone will always be
suboptimal from a social or fiill information perspective. The fact that the demand for pure public
goods is difHcult to assess and payment is generally infeasible provides the economic rationale for
public, especially federal government, provision or subsidization of research.
Research that produces joint public-private goods can be more efficiently produced by
involving a mix of public and private financing because the private good component can only be
2obtained by "local" production. This public-private implication applies at two important levels: (1)
where the public level is federal and some benefits are state-specific, and (2) where the public level
spans firms or individuals and some beneHts are firm specific. If the private benefits are local in
the sense of being state specific, state governments should provide funding for research. .If private
benefits are firm-specific, then the private sector may Hnd it profitable to provide funding or
undertake the research. In the latter case, a strong intellectual property right system is required to
insure the private sector a major share of the benefits from its R&D activities (see Huffman and
Evenson 1993, Chapter 5 and 6).
Given these characteristics of the science economy, we see some disturbing trends in U.S.
funding and management of research. They are (i) a growing rent seeking behavior by constituents
of society (and rent receiving behavior of bureaucrats and politicians), and (ii) the prospect
of dramatic institutional changes in the funding mechanism and management of research. Funding
mechanisms at issue are (1) federal competitive grant allocation in lieu of formula funding,
(2) federal block-grants to states with minimal guidance about use, and (3) direct interest-group
funding and management of public research (e.g., by commodity groups and private industry).
Our objective in this paper is to examine efficiency implications of national and local policies
for funding andmanagement of agricultural research. We examinethe possibility that increased rent
seeking activities reduce both the real resources allocated to public research and the productivity with
which these resources are used.
Disturbing National Trends
From the standpoint of a national science perspective, one of the most disturbing trends is
illustrated in the lower chart of Figure 1. Expenditures on R&D as a share of the federal budget
allocation trended upward significantly from 1940 to 1965. The budget share increased from well
3below1 percentto about8 percent. Since1965,however, the federal budgetshareallocated to R&D
has trended sharply downward, although with little change smce 1975. Just (1993) provides
econometric evidence obtained by fitting a switching-regressionmodel that suggests R&D funding
tends to be determined as a residual of major national concerns with defense or transfers to
entitlement interests. Using a bargamingmodel as a basis for mterpreting the econometric results,
the results suggest that budget allocations were largely driven by national defense needs from 1940
to 1965 whereas a high priority on entitlements and related expenses included in transfer payments
l^gely drove budget allocation from 1965 to 1990. The econometric results identify the associated
negative effect on the share of the federal budget allocated to R&D.
The upper chart in Figure 1 demonstrates that a domin^t component of the federal budget
since 1940 has been national defense. More than 40 percent was. allocated to defense during most
of the 1940's, 1950's, and 1960*s. With the end ofWorld War II and the Korean War, and finally
the end of the Cold War, defense needs have declined not withstanding the Reagan defense buildup.
On the other hand, the middle chart of Figure 1 demonstrates that over 30 percent of the federal
budget has been allocated to transfer payments since 1975. Federal transfer programs are payments
associatedwith entitlement programs where payments are guaranteed to individuals or entities fitting
a particular category, direct subsidy programs, and interest on deficit spending related to these
programs. (Figure 1 shows a large federal budget share for transfer payments during 1946-50 due
to GI programs that compensated World War II veterans. If these programs are reclassified as
defense related spending, then both defense and transfer payments follow long running trends after
about 1945.)
Transfer payments represented only about 15 percent of the federal budget in the early
1950's. Transfer payments then rose gradually as a share until the late 1960*s when the new welfare
programs kicked in. For about a decade, starting in 1967, transferpayments grew very rapidly as
4a share of the federal budget. Since 1980, the growth in the federal budget share spent on transfer
payments has stopped (see figure 1), but not yet declined. This behavior of entitlements as a budget
share since the 1970*s suggests an explosive growth in rent-seeking activities. If R&D funding
indeed is determined as a residual of higher priority entitlement and other transfer interests, then one
must conclude that the federal budget share allocated to R&D has paid part of the price of growing
entitlements interests in recent years just as it gained from declining defense spending in the 1950's
and early 1960's.
- From the standpoint of the agricultural science perspective, a second disturbing national trend
is illustrated in the lower chart of Figure 2. The agricultural share of federal R&D spending was
nearly 40 percent in 1940 but dropped sharply with the buildup of defense R&D during World War
II. By 1945, agricultural R&D represented less than 2.5 percent of federal R&D. By comparison,
defense R&D exploded to over 60 percent durmg 1941-43. At the end of the War, the share of
federal agricultural R&D expenditures recovered somewhat during the late 1940's, but most of the
decline in defense R&D went to R&D in other areas. During the 1950's, the agricultural share of
federal R&D declined from about 6 percent to less than 2 percent and has remained low since. The
share of federal R&D for other areas (represented roughly by a additive inverse of defense R&D in
Figure 2 after 1945) grew r^idly for a short time after 1943, but sustained growth in other R&D
occurred from the mid 1950's to the 1960's. From 1980 to 1985, the federal R&D share allocated
to other areas was temporarily reduced as Reagan built up defense R&D. While a Reagan effect on
the agricultural share of R&D is not obvious from Figure 2, the share dropped from 2 percent to 1.5
percent from 1980 to 1985 so the relative effect was substantial. The relative decline in other R&D
was even larger.
In summary, agricultural R&D appears to havetaken a backseat in federal budget allocation
for over 50 years, first to defense R&D and later to other forms of R&D. Based on accumulated
5history, substantial growth in agricultural R&D does notappear to bea likely prospect. Ontheother
hand, agricultural R&D has demonstrated substantial staying power over the past 30 years.
Figure 3 reveals a further vulnerability ofthe federal agricultural R&D budget. This figure
shows that, aside from fads, R&D allocation between agricultural and non-defense R&D is largely
driven by relative sector sizes (a comparison based onGDP rather than employment reveals similar
results). One "fad" related to the war years appears in the 1940's where non-agricultural sectors
experiences many spillover effects. Another fad occurred in the 1960*s related to space sciences
R&D. Finally, a third fad occurs during the 1980*s related to the Reagan defense buildup. Aside
from these fads, the two lines in Figure 3 roughly coincide throughout the 50 year period. This
interpretation of the data suggests a current vulnerability of agricultural R&D compared to other
sectors if the two lines in Figure 3 are to again converge m tighter budget times.
Figure 4 begins to examine the effects of federal budget allocation on state agricultural
experiment stations and compares to associated developments in other sources of funding. The state
agricultural experiment station system is a major producerof agricultural research, especially of the
pretechnology and applied types. Figure4 demonstrates howthe composition of the SAES system*s
revenue has changed over tune. At the turn of the century, federal funds accounted for most of
SAES support. By 1940, state government ^propriations accounted for 44.3 percent, federal funds
(CSRS-administered) for 33.1 percent, and all other funds for 22.6 percent. Twenty years later, the
state government share had increased to 58.2 percent, but federal funds had declined to 29.2 percent,
and other revenue sources were 12.6 percent. In 1990, federal funds were down further to 26.1
percent, and growth in the state funding share had reversed to 55 percent, while other sources has
risen to 18.9 percent. Overall, since 1960 both federal and state government funding have been
declining as a share of SAES budgets while other sources have begun to increase substantially
(although not yet reaching pre-1940's levels).
6Figure5 further demonstrates the change in composition of federal funds toward competitive
grants. Not only has the share of federal funds in SAES budgets been declining, but the share of
regular (Hatch) funds in federal fimds has been declining. The share of regular funds in federal
funds allocated to SAES*s was virtually 100 percent prior to 1940 but has declined steadily and
rapidly to less than 54 percent in 1990. These trends have followed from mstitution and emphasis
of such programs as USDA*s Competitive Grants Program which was established in 1977. The
Competitive Grants Program has attempted recently to fund projects on the frontiers of science.
Most priority areas and funding have been in the biological sciences.
Hie trend towardcompetitive allocation of fiinds is further depicted in Figure 6 which shows
the share of CSRS-administered funds that have been allocated through competitive grants. This
sharewas non-existentbefore 1965but has grown steadily to over 31 percent by 1990. With current
plans for the National Research Initiative, the share of competitively-allocated fimds promises to
continue to increase.
A further potentially disturbing trend in SAES funding is represented in Figure 7 which
depicts the rising private share of funds obtained from non-government sources. Before 1940, the
share of non-government funds obtained from private sources such as private firms and commodity
groups was virtually non-existent. But this share has grown rapidly to 70 percent in 1990. This
raises a serious question about whether private funds are being used to manipulate and leverage
research emphasis. An interesting question is whether the mix of public-private research not
undertaken by SAES*s is socially optimal and consistent with current scientific potential, or whether
SAES research activity is increasingly being captured by private interests in tight budget times due
to rent seeking activity.
Commodity group funding of agricultural research has been facilitated by federal marketing
orders by federal legislation. Federal marketing order provisions were established in 1937, and
7federal and/or state marketing orders exist for fluid milk and many fresh fruits and vegetables.
Federal orders facilitate agricultural producers banding together to tax themselves in order to fimd
commodity promotion activities including both advertising and research. In addition, the 198S Farm
Bill enacted provisions for national mandatory commodity check-off program levies at the point of
sale by producers. The check-off rate has recently been raised for some commodities. Although
a larger share of this revenue has been allocated to advertising historically, the increase in total
check-off may lead to significant increases in private funding of agricultural research. This
development in the agricultural sector is consistent with a national trend across all colleges and
universities whereby the rate of growth of research support was largest from private industry. See
Figure 8 and Lee and Mansfield (1995).
Another significant development after 1980 has been the increasing composition of federal
funding associated with academic earmarks (U.S. Congress, OTA 1991). In this process, a
congressman attaches a provision to a federal agency's research budget that a specified quantity of
research funds must be "passed through" to a particular state's research institution. The amount of
academic earmarks for particular projects before 1980was very small. However, in 1980 and 1981,
two federal appropriations subcommittees allocated about $10 billion to academic earmarks (Figure
9). This amount grew rapidly to $232 billion in 1988 from nine subcommittees before tailing off
to smaller amounts in 1989 and 1990. However, agricultural earmarks havenot tailed offas quickly
or substantially as have non-agricultural earmarks. Furthermore, the share of agriculture in overall
earmarks is much larger than the share of agriculture in federal R&D. To the extent that earmarks
manifest rent-seeking aaivity, these comparisons raise concerns aboutwhether agriculture is more
subject to rent-seeking activity and how rent-seeking activity may redirect agricultural R&D.
Figure 10 presents Lorenz curve distributions of real total academic earmarks from 1980 to
1989 with states and by universities as units of analysis. What forms should these distributions
8follow? If academic earmarks were distributed equally among states or universities, then the
cumulative distribution would be a straight line. Any ten percent of the states would receive 10
percent of theearmarked funds. Moregenerally, if academic earmark projects represent independent
random variables from a population having a fmite mean and limiting average variance, then the
academic earmarktotals by stateor university have thestatistical properties of summations of random
variables. This means state totalswill possessa limiting normaldistribution(Greene 1993). In other
words, the cumulative distribution over states or universities will havea limiting normal distribution.
In this case, the Lorenz curve Will be bowed upward above a straight line suggesting inequality.
The information in Figure 10 clearly implies that academic earmarks are not allocated
uniformly across states or universities. On the other hand, the evidence in Figure 10 is roughly
consistent with academic earmarks being independent draws from a normal distribution. Upon
further examination, however, one finds strong positive serial correlation of academic earmarks by
state (U.S. Congress, OTA, 1991, Table 3.4, pp. 92). While one could argue that persistent
inequalities among states may be due to inertia in technical abilities of scientists or quality of
research establishments, this evidence is also consistent with differing rent-seeking behavior by states
and universities. We view the mere existence of academic earmarks, given the other options for state
research institutions to receive federal subsidies, as an indicator of rent-seeking activity and thus see
persistent inequality among states as an indicator of rent-seeking activity.
Our conclusion is that several indicators show increased rent seeking activities in federal
budget allocations and in SAES sources of funding. Furthermore, we interpret a greater share of
SAES research funding coming from federal competitive grants and earmarks and from private
commodity and industry sources as opening up and widening the channels to further rent seeking
activities that have the potential to be detrimental to research productivity.
9The Economics of Alternative Public Resource Allocation Mechanisms
This section lays out major conceptual issues focusing on the economics of public good
provision, the functioning of political institutions, and implications for public funding of agricultural
research.
Efficient Provision of Pure and Impure Public Goods. A pure public good such as
national defense, weather forecasting provides benefits to many. Public goods are non-rival in use
and non-excludable. A good is non-rival if one user does not affect the quantity of the good
available to other prospective users. A good is non-excludable if excluding a particular potential user
is not economical and perhaps not physically possible. These properties give rise to a free-rider
problem where everyone wants the benefits but no one wants to pay the cost. Hence, equilibrium
private provision of pure public goods may be zero (Gradstein 1992), but the full-information or
social optimiun quantity will be positive and perhaps large. Comes and Sandier (1986) and others
summarize the advantages and disadvantages of alternative government funding mechanisms for pure
public goods. All such mechanisms involve some ^e of national government tax collection with
proceeds spent on production (and distribution) of public goods.
Efficient Provision of Impure Public Goods. Impure public goods have both public good
and private good attributes. For example, a goodmight provide benefits that are location specific.
If a good provides benefits that are state specific but non-rival and non-excludable within state, then
it is an impure public good. That is, it is rival or excludable at the national level. In this case, state
governments should collect taxes and fiind production and distribution of the impure public good
locally. See Gradstein (1992) for other possibleoptions.
Another type of impure public good arises when a goodprovides location- specific benefits
with reduced marginal benefits in surrounding localities. For example, if these imperfect spill-overs
go to other states, then a social benefit canbe obtained by affected states forming a single decision-
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making imit to provide the optimal amount of the impure public good. Other funding mechanisms
and their properties are also discussed in Comes and Sandier (1986). If the size of the benefitting
area from one locality's produaion of an impure public good extends to all areas within national
boundaries, then national government involvement in provision of impure public goods will generally
be socially optimal (Khanna, Huffman, and Sandier 1994).
Because private sector provision of public goods is suboptimal, economists and others
generally argue that the government sectors should provide funding for pure public goods. For
impure public goods, the free-rider problem, although generally present, is less severe. Sometimes
the private good attribute can be used as the metering device for use of the public good and for
charging for use of both goods (see Stigler 1974; Gradstein 1992). Although a private sector
solution may not be fully optimal, it may provide a satisfactory policy. In other cases, local
government involvement may be necessary.
Models of Politica] and Bureaucratic Behavior. In the case of government funding of
R&D, political and bureaucratic behavior must be examined. Agents of private industry are
motivated primarily by long-run profits, and this limits greatly the type and extent of behavior they
can pursue. Households and agents of nonprofit institutions are generally perceived by economists
as maximizing utility subject to one or more resource and technology constraints. Because
households and nonprofit institutions do not use an objective yardstick such as profit, they can
engage in a much wider range of behavior (e.g., various forms of discrimination and nepotism) than
agents of private industry.
Bureaucrats and politicians seem to form an intermediate category of agents. They may be
motivated by (1) public interest, (2) fads, and (3) interest group pressure, including payoffs and
bribes for "favorable" treatment. Their behavior, however, is limited by the need for periodical re-
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election (directly or indirectly). Voting in democratic societies transmits private information of
voters much like market prices transmit private information of traders (Lohman 1994).
Publicagents that behave in the public mterest behave as socially benevolent publicservants.
They make decisions on public research and other public goods to correct market failures and
provide socially optimal quantities of all public goods. Their public sector decisions will be fully
social efficient. Considerable doubt exists, however, about whether public sector agents follow this
modeof behavior (e.g., see Petzman 1976; Huffman andEvenson 1993, Chapter 8).
Public agents can reasonably be assumed to have a utility function that reflects the effect of
public sector decisions on their ownwelfare. They may have preferences about philosophies that
underline public programs, their status in the political bureaucracy, their allocation of time on the
"job," their amount of leisure time, and their quantity of traditional consumption goods. A utility
function containing some or all of these arguments couldbe used to predict a wide range of political
behavior.
Status-seeking seems to be an innate trait of most humans, and cultures have developed
effective signals for status including fashions leading to fads (Stigler and Becker 1977-; Grief 1994;
Coelho and McCIure 1993). Hence, status is one attribute of the utility function that can be the
source of "fads" in political and bureaucratic policies. Suppose status (e.g., prestige, esteem,
popularity, or acceptance) is defined as the perception by other politicians or bureaucrats of an
individud as distinct from the actions of the individual (see Bemheim 1994). However, because
perceptions are unobservable, actions are generally the indicator that signals perceptions and affects
status. Bemheim (1994) shows that if status within the bureaucracy is sufficiently important relative
to other arguments of a bureaucrat's utility function, then he will conform to a single, homogenous
standard of behavior, despite heterogenous underlying preferences. Within a bureaucracy,
individuals may be censured for small deviations from a political or social norm. In equilibrium.
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any departure from the norm isconstrued as evidence ofextreme preferences, and all status-oriented
bureaucrats will shade theirchoices toward thepolitical norm. This type of agent behavior gives rise
to policy -fads," which are transitory, and policy customs, which are norms that persist.
The value placed by bureaucrats on fashion most likely depends on the stock held by other
bureaucrats. This causes interdependencies among bureaucrats about what is regarded as "good" or
"important" or at the forefront among policies. Fads or fashions seem tobepart of the explanation
for resource allocation bybureaucrats as well as agents ofnonprofit institutions and consumers. This
is especially true when the expected term ofpoliticians orbureaucrats is shorter than the period over
which the social costs and benefits of policies are realized. Because many benefits of research
stretch over 25years or more, R&D policy seems tobean area where policy fads could be socially
very counterproductive from a long-term social perspective.
Whenever governments allocate resources such as revenues or rights to public property,
economists frequently see the potential for private-interest pressure groups. Individuals or agents
who have relatively homogenous private interests form political interest groups to obtain or prevent
income and wealth transfers by public policies (Peltzman 1976; Magee, Brock and Young 1989;
Lohman 1994). These groups generally use the resources of their members (votes in public
elections, wealth, status) to exert pressure that furthers the primary interests of their members. The
target of a political interest group is elected officials andbureaucrats and (directly or indirectly) other
interest groups. Thus, interest groups compete for favorable treatment in public policies.
Public policies are usually a compromise and represent a weighted average of the policy
positions taken by interested pressure groups, given the institutional structure. The weights are
determined by relative rather than absolute pressure exerted. Furthermore, relative pressure is not
necessarily proportional to the number of members or votes that an interest group directly controls
because small, homogenous, well-funded and organized interest groups can be relatively powerful
13
(seeMagee. Brock, and Young 1989). Some of this power can arise by mobilizing other relatively
neutral interest groups (Lx)hman 1994).
Many interest groups operate in the public R&D arena. The implications of the literature on
political interest groups has an important lesson that should raise serious concerns regarding an
increasingly political R&D funding process. The lesson is four-fold. First, allocating increased
effort to capturing at least a piece of a political process wastes effort better spent on socially
desirable activities. Second, because pressure counts only in a relative sense, the incentives to
increasesocially unproductiveefforts cangrow rapidly and easily becomeexcessive. Third, because
of the tendency toward "fads" caused by status-seeking, an increasingly political process of decision
making can lead to a reduced portfolio of socially good research options. Fourth, because fads tend
to be temporary and research is a long-term venture, critical time can be lost with frequent
redirection.
Implications for Public R&D Allocations
Block Grants. We now turn to implications for the funding of agricultural research. In this
discussion, we regard the application of broad federal block-grant funding as a policy fad. Although
federal block grants to States may make some economic and political sense for certain types of
entitlements, unrestricted block grants are an inappropriate mechanism for funding pure public goods
and impure public goods where benefits spill over regionally or nationally.
Public agricultural research has been shown to produce joint products (Huffman and Evenson
1993; Khanna, Huffman, and Sandier 1994) that have benefits that spill over to other states as well
as state specific benefits. A significant share of these benefits are from the spillover effects (about
40 percent for the United States as a whole). Furthermore, the social marginal real return is about
40 percent. Clearly, public agricultural research has been a good social investment. However,
14
because of the significant interstate spillover effects, state governments cannot be expected to see or
internalize the incentives for a socially reasonable allocation of funds to public agricultural research.
For example, if the 40 percent of benefits due to spillover effects are ignored, then agricultural
research which would otherwise have an excellent rate of return may be viewed myopically as a poor
investment. These are strong reasons for federal structure and involvement in the funding and
direction of public agricultural research. Once fimds currently used for R&D are put into a state's
hands with authority for redirection, greater incentives are needed to take out-of-state benefits of
R&D into account.
Competitive Grants and Private Funding. The environment in which the SAES system has
been soliciting funding for research has been changing. The federal sector has generally been
moving toward allocating a larger share of funds by competition including competition across fields
and competitive grants within fields. Additionally, the private sector has been increasingly willing
to enter into joint ventures and provide research grants and contracts. These activities increase
access to research funding but provide the opportunity for greater rent seeking activities. Hence,
these trends can become improductive because they endogenize the share of human capital services
that is allocated to socially unproductive rent-seeking activities and direct resources away from
socially productive innovation.
Sturzenegger and Tommasi (1994) present an economic model showing the negative effects
of missallocating human capital away from innovation and toward rent-seeking activities. They
endogenize the share of scientists* time that is allocated to innovation and to the alternative activity
of pursuing public funding of R&D, i.e., rent seeking. Given that public R&D funds can in
principle be allocated by any arbitrary formula that does not consume human capital services, an
alternative allocation system that absorbs human capital services carries a heavy burden of social
waste in the sense of reducing the rate of innovation and economic growth. Opponents of this view
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would argue that competition is needed to select only the best research projects. However, if
research activities are dominated bv output uncertaintv. then selection processes can become
subjective and simply serve to narrow the research portfolio.
Sturzenegger andTommasi further show thatthe rate of irmovation andeconomic growth are
enhanced by limiting the access points to political power affecting the allocation of federal R&D
funds. Consider, for example, redistribution across fields like agriculture, defense, health,
resources, and energy. Sturzenegger and Tommasi show that equal horizontal equity in accessing
political power by interest groups is not socially beneficial. Equal power access causes research
agents to perceive that they "have a chance" for a larger share, and this creates incentives to allocate
human capital to redistributional activities (and away from research). When political power is quite
unequally distributed among interest groups or is openly biased (e.g., due to idealogy) in favor of
some research agents, more innovation can result. The reason is thatwhen "wirmers" and "losers"
are clearly defined, a larger share of available human capital services is allocated to innovation and
less is allocated to socially unproductive redistributional activities. Their model also predicts that
randomshocksto the politicalpower process (that are not due to interestgroup's activities depreciate
political power and increase the returns to innovation. The reason is that these shocks cut the
productivity of the lobbying efforts while the productivity of innovation is unaffected.
These results surface the possibility that efforts to move toward competitive grants for SAES
research with equal access to the allocation process will reduce innovation and economic growth over
the long term. Some empirical evidence supports this conclusion. Chubin and Hackett (1990) show
that research activities are affected by politics, including competitive grant and peer review
processes. McKenny (1994) has shown that the value of scientists* time spent chasing Canadian
forestry research funds amounted to 22 percent of the value of available grant funds. Lindbeck
(1995) and Freeman (1995) conclude that social welfare states will ultimately collapse due the long-
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term incentives created for socially unproductive rent-seeking activities. Consistent with current
trends, a parallel conclusion for agricultural research aigents will increasingly find a larger share of
their time being allocated to the transactions costs of research and the rate of innovation will
approach zero.
The Value of Diversity
The organization of an activity where the technology of production is dominated by
uncertainty and where relative outcomes are strategy-dependent is best decentralized. This
conclusion follows from the principle of optimal portfolio theory where agents are at least slightly
risk averse. Furthermore, a larger expected outcome can frequently be obtained from a diverse
rather than a single-item portfolio of program or projects. This is particul^ly true when many
activities have public good spillover effects. This is the lesson recognized in the current emphasis
on biological and genetic diversity. A richness and cross-fertilization of ideas can be just as
important as having a diverse gene pool for biological research. Finally, a diversified decision-
making strategy increases the cost of political maneuvermg by politically powerful and perhaps
socially misdirected interest groups. For these reasons, we believe that a significant amount of
diversity of approaches to R&D problems promises to be the most productive over the long term.
In this spirit, public agricultural research programs should contain considerable diversity of
intellectual pursuits (but not be diversity driven). For research in the general and pretechnology
sciences, diversity of intellectual pursuits has v^ue in any specific tield. Options need not be "too
large" because in most fields closely related research pursuits are substitutes. The winner receives
all the credit and later discovers receive little credit. More to the point, for research teams pursuing
a scientific breakthrough in one area, the marginal productivityofone team is reduced by an increase
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in productivity of the other team. This type of substitution is associated with the. potential for
research over investment in the aggregate (see Olson 1993; Lazear and Rosen 1981).
TTie early scientific discoveries and commercial development of hybrid com provide a clear
example of how diversity of intellectual. pursuits reduced the time to . innovation and
commercialization. Significant early research on inbreeding and cross breeding was conducted by
EdwardEast (first at the University of Illinois and later at the NewHaven SAES) and George Shull
(attheCold Springs Harbor, NY, laboratory for general sciences). Eaststarted as a chemist in 1900
and later worked as a com breeder at the Illinois Agricultural Experiment Station on a project that
attempted to raise the protein and oil content of com. After reviewing the records of these
experiments, hebecame convinced thatinbreeding concentrated particular genetic characteristics into
pure lines. A controversy over a proposed experiment to determine the effect of inbreeding on oil
and protein content of com with the director of the Illinois project (C.B. Hopkins) hastened East's
exit from Illinois.
East then joined the Connecticut AgriculturalExperiment Station in New Haven, to head com
breeding research for the new director, Edward H. Jenkins. East conducted a program of inbred line
development and crossed these pure lines to obtain single-cross hybrids. He made his first cross in
1907 and in 1908 obtained fantastic success with one single-cross hybrid that yielded over 200
bushels per acre. East presented his results at breeder's meetings in 1908 and 1909.
In 1909, East joined the faculty of Harvard University's Bussey Institute. The director of
the New Haven station made a special arrangement to keep the unusually talented East as director
of the Connecticut com breeding program for about 10 more years. In this arrangement. East
selected promising graduate students from his classes at Harvard, and they were hired to handle the
Connecticut com breeding research under East's direction. The students were to work at the
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experimental fann during the summer months while pursuing studies at Harvard during the winter
months.
This arrangement proved to be a powerful force for advancing hybrid com research. East
was now ^le to attract exceptional graduate students and to have the opportunity for the first time
to challenge students with his revolutionary principles of plantbreeding. East's graduate program
during tfie next 20 years was a leading source of outstanding com plant breeders. Under his
direction, theNew Haven Agricultural Experiment Station became thecenter ofhybrid comresearch
in the United States.
A key factor regarding the practical useof single-cross hybrids by farmers was thehigh cost
of seedproduction. During the earlyyears, inbreds used in single crosses were generally poor seed
producers. Thus, it was impossible to obtain enough seed from these inbred lines to produce
single-cross hybrid seed in large enough quantities to make hybrid com a commercial success.
Furthermore, the process of crossing inbred lineswas too complex and time-consuming for farmers
to produce their own seed.
DonaldJones, a Harvard graduatestudent, discovered the solutionto the problemof high-cost
hybrid seed production using the seed of two single-cross hybrids as parents for a double-cross
hybrid. From double-cross experunents, Jones obtained insights about hybrid vigor. He saw hybrid
vigor as the pooling of favorable dominant genes or Mendelian units of heredity from all parents of
a cross (East and Jones 1919). This new explanation for hybrid vigor and the possibilities for
creating and controlling it revived some plant breeders' interests in the practical importance ofhybrid
com, e.g., Henry Wallace (Cr^b 1947; Marcus 1983). Jones' discovery, or rediscovery, of the
double cross was of immense importance to making hybrid com commercially successful in the
United States.
19
It is ironic that the first commercial (double-cross) hybrid com varieties were produced for
New England farmers rather than for Com Belt farmers. However, the Connecticut Agricultural
Experiment Station at New Haven at that time was the intellectual center for science applied to the
practical problems of com varietal improvement because of their ties to the Yale and Harvard
Scientific Schools (see Huffman and Evenson 1993).
The agricultural experiment stations in the Com Belt states and ARS of the USDA had com
research programs during the first two decades of the 20th century, but scientists in these programs
failed to piece together the complex puzzle lying behind commercial hybrid com. Some stations
focused their com research on improving open pollinated varieties (e.g., Iowa), and others engaged
in inbreeding or pure line development (e.g., Illinois and Indiana). Some had tried but were not
impressed with single-cross hybrids. When Jones discovered double crosses in 1916-19, C. D.
Hartley, director of the USDA's com breeding programs and several directors of com research in
Com Belt agricultural experiment stations were convinced that hybrid com had no practical
importance. This attitude significantly delayed hybrid com research in Minnesota, Indiana, and
Illinois.
The interesting exercise is to imagine how the development of hybrid com would have
unfolded if research funds were allocated competitively or if the research portfolio would have been
narrowed due to current views (fads). Would East's research have been selected by a process
controlled by those seeking status in the accepted regimes of belief associated with open-pollinated
varieties? Apparently, these forces were sufficient to cause East's departure from Illinois. East's
interests were pursued only because of diversity in the decentralized SAES system. On the other
hand, because of significant spillover effects, thebenefits ofhybrid varieties wereeventually realized
in Com Belt states where scientists originally rejected suchpossibilities.
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Efficient Organization and Management of Local Research Units
In a final section, we turn to the question of how productive science can be fostered if not
through competitive allocation of research funds. The organization and management of research
along effective lines is very important and complex in single-goal institutions such as biotechnology
firms, but even more difficult in a multi-goal institutions like major universities. Universities are
of primary concern in SAES research funding because almost all of the SAES's are part of a major
university w^ere instruction (teaching at the lindergraduate and graduate levels), research (spanning
general, pretechnology, and applied sciences), and extension or outreach activities are major
activities. Thus, SAES scientists regularly have appointments requiring allocation of tune and effort
among the three land-grant functions of research, teaching, and extension.
Incentives for Individual Scientists. One key management issue is whether job descriptions
or assigned activity muces are packaged so that a scientist's major activities are complementary
(Holmstrom aiidMilgrom 1994). The primary instrument that deans and directors have for directing
scientist's activities is the marginal incentive plan: (1) performance rewards, (2) worker freedom
(to define aspects of the job), and (3) returns from possible full or part ownership of intellectual
property produced.
When several activities compete for a scientist's scarce time and attention, incentives can
easily be misapplied. For example, if the incentive for one activity, say research, is increased, but
incentives for other activities remain unchanged, then the scientist may devote too much effort to
research while neglecting other activities. If, however, incentives are increased for all the scientist's
activities, misallocation may be avoided. Hence, when several activities compete for a scientist's
effort, the level of incentives for all should be complementary. This generally requires a balancing
of the three major incentive instruments available to supervisors (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1994).
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Performance incentives can be fiirther strengthenedby combining activities in scientist's jobs
throughjob descriptions so that the majoractivities are complementary. By thiswe mean, that time
and effort allocated to one activity increases the productivityof the scientist's time and effort in other
activities. For example, conductmg high quality research on any topic and teaching a graduate
course on a similar topic where research assistants take the course is an example of highly
complementary teaching and research activities. With this mix of activities, a scientist's long-term
performance in several activities can be preserved and encouraged.
Alternatively, when a scientist teaches in an area that is unrelated to his research efforts,
teaching and research are substitutes. In die latter case, over the long term, serious job performance
problems are likely to surface in teachmg, research or both. These types of job descriptions or
duties should be changed or avoided. Attempting to change a developing problem where teaching
and research are substitutes by careful monitoring seems likely to be an unproductive and perh^s
counterproductive activity (Frey 1993). Tighter monitoring when a scientist and dean have an
implicit contract for performance is likely to be interpreted as distrust and this frequently reduces
work effort further (Frey 1993). No other approach appears to substitute for negotiating good job
descriptions and using effective reward instruments wisely to induce good performance of scientists
who engage in multiple activities.
Incentives for Teams of Scientists. Many research projects, however, require the use of
a team (two or more scientists and perhaps other personnel). Setting rewards for team efforts is
more difficult than for individual scientists. The nature of the problem can be defmed along the
following lines. In general and pretechnology scientific research, outputs or innovations are not
contractible. Innovations, are ill-defined because of overwhelming uncertainty in the innovation
production process. Furthermore, problems of adverse seleaion (each member's ability to solve a
research problem is known only to himself) and moral hazard (each team member's effort is
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unobservable and not contractible) are present (see McAfee and McMillian 1991; Aghion and Tirole
1994). Also, ability and effort are frequently not correlated in the same way across (possible) team
members. Ex ante all that can be determined is a commitment of effort by team members, the
allocation of property rights on any innovation or intellectual property, and the sharing rule for
rewards associated with the innovation (e.g., order of authors name on a publication or division of
patent/copyright royalties).
A solution to this problem must be attempted ex ante by the prmcipal agent who may be a
team leader or dean. The marginal reward scheme for each team member must be constructed such
that his reward depends not only on his own (reported) ability but also on the (reported) ability of
all team members. This is achieved by getting each team member to make a voluntary ability
assessment ex ante which is related to the share of the ex post total reward that he can receive. This
then creates an incentive for each team member to reveal his own ability for the project but also to
commit a particular amount of effort to the project. The team members are each induced to exert
more effort (1) the greater is their own ability and (2) the greater is the ability of their teammates
(McAfee and McMillan 1991). Each team member has an incentive to adopt high ability teammates.
In this model, monitoring of effort by a supervisor is not a productive activity, so no human
resources are allocated to supervision and no risk of causing distrust by supervision is present.
Incentives for Public Private Cooperation. A final issue is how the public (SAES) and
private sector (corporation) should share intellectual property resulting from joint ventures. With
joint ventures the investor either makes a monetary commitment to the project which is contractible
or provides proprietary services (data, technology, equipment, facilities). Such services are often
subject to availability and thus contractible. A particular innovation is not contractible, but the
probability of discovery is positively related to ability and effort of the scientists and the tot^
resources invested. Uniform sharesin any intellectual property created (property rights) fromajoint
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venture has advantages because otherwise the research unit or scientists will tend to work too hard
on that con^)onent where they get the largest share. This effort is generally impossible to monitor.
When there are multiple innovations or multiple customers, property rights should be split on the
basis of comparative advantage in creating value from the innovations (Aghion and Tirole 1994).
Joint ventures are not conducive to technology transfer (innovation diffusion), however, because
added con^tition is imposed on the joint-venture firm when the intellectual property is used by
other firms. This is perhaps one of the most difficult problems deserving of further research.
Conclusions
Several current trends in agricultural R&D funding are disturbing. These include (1) a long-
✓
term decline in R&D funding as a share of the federal budget, (2) a long-term declme in the
agricultural share of federal R&D, (3) a more recent decline in the share of SAES funding borne by
states, (4) a temporary disequilibrium that suggests further decline in federal agricultural R&D
funding, and (5) a substantial increase in private funding, earmarks, and competitive allocation of
agricultural research funding. Many of these trends manifest increasing rent-seeking activity in the
budget allocation process.
These developments make agricultural research funding increasingly vulnerable to interest
group pressures which will tend toward socially wasteful rent-seeking activity within the scientific
community and reduce productivity of innovations accordingly. Increasing departure from federal
formula funding of agricultural experiment stations promises to increase the response of effort to fads
at the expense of long-term productivity because typical research cycles are longer than the life of
political fads. More centralized competitive allocation of research funds will tend to narrow the
diversity of research approaches because of scienUflc fads and pursuit of intellectual status and
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reduce productivity accordingly. On the other hand, block grants to states will result in under
investment in agricultural research because spillover returns ^ong states will not be valued.
Research shows that better methods than competitive grants exist to manage scientific
research through proper structuring of incentives. By structuring duties to take advantage of
complementarities, productive activities of individual scientists canbe fostered andmaintained. By
using the principles forthcoming from principal-agent theory, teams of scientists can be structured
to induce ^propriate information sharing and self supervision. Several important principles have
beendeveloped in the publicgood literature that appear to have important applications in structurmg
public-private partnerships between universities and private industry. However, application ofthose
principles ^)pears to reniain a fruitful area for further research.
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Figure 8. Growth in University and College R&D
Performance by Source of Funds, Fiscal 1978-88
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Figure 10. Apparent Academic Earmarks by State and at
Universities and Colleges, Fiscal 1980-89
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